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Malware today
‣ Malicious software: A vivid threat
‣ Plethora of worms, trojans, bots, backdoors
‣ Exponential growth of malware in the wild
‣ Emergence of criminal “industries”
‣ Conventional static defenses insufficient












‣ Malware differs in purpose 
and functionality
‣ Typical and discriminative 
behavioral patterns
‣ Behavior-based analysis
‣ Monitoring and detection of malicious behavior
‣ AV products: manually generated behavior rules











‣ Clustering of malware behavior  (e.g. Bailey et al., RAID 2007)
‣ Difficult to control cluster models (many vs. few)
‣ Clustering often non-predictive, e.g. linkage clustering
‣ Idea: Generalize from behavior and prior knowledge
‣ Incorporate (noisy) labels, e.g. by anti-virus tool

































‣ Automatic collection of current malware families
‣ Broad range of malware using diverse methods, 







(e.g. Bächer et al., RAID 2006)
Monitoring malware
‣ Sandbox for malware 
‣ Protected execution environment (e.g. CWSandbox)







  copy src=‘bla’ dst=‘foo’
  open file=‘secret.txt’
Network:
  ping host=‘10.1.2.3’
  connect host=’10.1.2.3’
Registry:
  setkey name=‘autostart’







  copy src=‘a’ dst=‘b’
  open file=‘secret.txt’
Network:
  ping host=‘10.1.2.3’
  connect host=’10.1.2.3’










(Rieck et al., JMLR 2008)
ffi(x) =





‣ Discrimination of malware families in feature space




‣ Learn maximum-margin hyperplane w for each family
‣ Incorporation of non-linearity using kernel functions
Trojan BWorm A Backdoor C
(see Burges, KDDM 1998)
Experimental evaluation
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Malware family #k #u  Malware family #k #u
1: Backdoor.VanBot 91 169    8: Worm.Korgo 244 4
2: Trojan.Bancos 279 208    9: Worm.Parite 1215 19
3: Trojan.Banker 834 185  10: Worm.PoeBot 140 188
4: Worm.Allaple 1500 614  11: Worm.Rbot 1399 904
5: Worm.Doomber 426 0  12: Worm.Sality 661 0
6: Worm.Gobot 777 0  13: Worm.SdBot 777 597
7: Worm.IRCBot 229 107  14: Worm.Virut 1500 144
‣ Malware collection labeled using AV tool (AntiVir)
‣ #k: 10,072 malware binaries from 14 families
‣ #u: 3,139 unknown variants (detected 4 weeks later)
Results: Classification
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Known variants, avg. 88% Unknown variants, avg. 69%
‣ High detection accuracy (Note: random guessing = 7%)





0.0142:  create_file ... srcpath="C:\windows\system32\" src=*
0.0073:  create_file ... srcpath="C:\windows\system32\" src="vcmgcd32.dl_"
0.0068:  delete_file ... srcpath="C:\windows\system32\" src=*
0.0051:  create_mutex name="kuku_joker_v3.09"
0.0035:  enum_processes apifunction="Process32First”
0.0084:  create_mutex name="GhostBOT0.58c"
0.0073:  create_mutex name="GhostBOT0.58b" 
0.0052:  create_mutex name="GhostBOT0.58a" 
0.0014:  enum_processes apifunction="Process32First" 
0.0011:  query_value key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\...\run" value="GUARD"
‣ Explanation of learned malware behavior classifier
‣ Most discriminative dimensions in hyperplane vectors
Conclusions
‣ Behavior-based malware analysis
‣ Extension of current AV tools  (see Oberheide et al., USENIX 2008)
‣ Hinders simple obfuscation and polymorphy
‣ Supervised learning on malware behavior
‣ Detection accuracy: 69% unknown malware variants
‣ No black box: Explanation via hyperplane vectors 
‣ Further extension: Rejection of unknown behavior
‣ Perspectives





‣ Detection of honeypot or sandbox environment
‣ Obfuscated and polymorphic behavior
‣ Mimic behavior of benign programs or other malware
‣ Consequences & defenses
‣ Run multiple honeypots and sandboxes in parallel
‣ Obfuscation and polymorphy: Discriminative features? 
‣ Fruitless to mimic benign program = No real activity 
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‣ Determine malware families
from structure only
‣ Difficult to control model 
complexity without labels
‣ Classification (supervised)
‣ Determine malware families
using structure and labels
‣ Generalization beyond 





‣ Rejection of unknown behavior
‣ Probabilistic fit on output of classifier (reject if <0.5)
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Known families Unknown families
‣ Reliable rejection of unknown behavior, yet accuracy 
decreases from 88% to 73%
Feature space
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‣ Embedding to high-dimensional vector space
‣ Each operation spans several dimensions
‣ > 1,000,000 and more dimensions 
‣ Visualization using projections (e.g. with PCA)
Trojan.Banker
Worm.Allaple
Worm.SdBot
